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A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia 
Ewa Fischer, Jadwiga Rogoża
The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in par-
ticular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consoli-
dation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social sup-
port for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black 
Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude 
oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) 
previously owned by the Ukrainian state.
However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the 
cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and 
socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian 
budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean econ-
omy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high 
costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the 
modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and 
paying out social benefits.
For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase 
region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the 
region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by 
Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravat-
ed by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its 
ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne 
by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have 
forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into ques-
tion is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of 
their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to 
be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and fi-
nally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.
Russia’s benefits from the annexation 
of Crimea
The annexation of Crimea has brought Russia 
and its government a number of benefits. It has 
contributed to an unprecedented consolida-
tion of the elites and the general public around 
Vladimir Putin. Support for the president has 
soared to 85-86%, an increase of almost 25% 
compared with the beginning of 20141. This has 
1 According to a WCIOM survey from 20 July 2014, sup-
port for Putin has risen to a record 86% (from 60.9% in 
January this year.). The Levada Centre poll of 24 July 2014 
recorded an increase to 85% (from 65% in January 2014).
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reversed the downward trend in support for Pu-
tin which had been observed since his return 
to the presidency in 2012, and yet again rein-
forced his position as the undisputed political 
and social leader.
The benefits for Russia include taking con-
trol over the sea and air space of the Black 
and Azov Seas. Russia has taken full con-
trol of the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, 
along with its military and maritime infra-
structure, and gained access to Ukrainian mil-
itary bases in Crimea. This will translate into 
annual savings of nearly $80 million from 
the abolition of fees for the database lease2. 
Millions of dollars will remain in the Russian 
budget due to the abolition of customs duties 
for supplies for the fleet, as well as for pass-
ing Russian ships through the Kerch-Yenikalskiy 
canal. The Black Sea Fleet is to be modernised 
(at a cost of $2.5 billion by 2020) and Crimean 
plants are to receive part of the orders from the 
Russian arms industry, which may contribute to 
their modernisation and a rise in production. 
Another strategic gain is Russia’s access to the 
Black Sea ports in Kerch, Feodosia and Sevas-
topol, and those ports’ shipping capacities, 
which will make the planned construction of 
a port on the Taman peninsula (in Krasnodar 
krai) unnecessary and save another $2.5 billion.
When Russia annexed Crimea, it also took over 
state-owned enterprises (in the spheres of 
manufacturing, repair, transport, education, 
scientific research, culture and others), and 
2 www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/26692171/100-mlrd-
ne-hvatit
part of the peninsula’s resort and sanatorium 
base. These enterprises are to be assigned to 
the Crimean authorities and Russian compa-
nies such as the state-owned Russian Railways3. 
By taking over Chernomorneftegaz (a subsidiary 
of Naftogaz Ukraine), Russia gained access to 
natural gas deposits located on the continental 
shelf of the Crimean peninsula4, as well as to its 
transmission infrastructure and 2 billion m3 of 
gas stored in an underground storage on the 
peninsula. Russia also took over the renowned 
Massandra winery, which is one of the largest 
wine producers in the CIS.
The costs Russia will bear
Moscow will treat Crimea as a showcase re-
gion. It is determined to demonstrate that the 
annexation of the peninsula will contribute to 
the development of the Crimean economy and 
raise its residents’ living standards. This requires 
multi-billion investments, both from the state 
budget and other sources. Former Finance Min-
ister Alexei Kudrin has estimated that the invest-
ments in Crimea will exceed the total cost of the 
reconstruction of the North Caucasus republics 
after the end of the Chechen wars5.
The annexation of the peninsula has already ab-
sorbed nearly $4.5 billion from Russia’s federal 
budget6. These funds have been used to balance 
the budgets of Crimea and Sevastopol ($1.6 bil-
lion) to set up the region’s executive structures, 
issue passports, pay pensions, raise public sec-
tor employees’ salaries (which were much low-
3 The Ukrainian ministries and agencies had owned ap-
proximately 200 recreational and sanatorium facilities 
and residences used by top government officials.
4 In 2013, gas production on the continental shelf of the 
Crimean peninsula reached 1.65 billion m3. According to 
Sergey Donskoy, Russia’s minister of natural resources, 
crude oil deposits in the Crimea total 47 million tons, 
and natural gas deposits 165.3 billion m3, along with 
18.2 million tons of gas condensate. Five gas and three 
condensate deposits were discovered on the Black Sea 
shelf, and six gas fields on the shelf of the Sea of Azov. 
angi.ru/news.shtml?oid=2812305
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46WN_OaiWXs
6 www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/28853561/krym-
prisoedinitsya-k-150-mlrd-rub
The annexation of Crimea has result-
ed in an unprecedented consolidation 
around Vladimir Putin and reversed the 
downward trend in public support for him 
which had been observed since his return 
to the Kremlin.
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er than those in Russia), to cover the most ur-
gent social needs and to secure transport links 
($2.9 billion)7. Part of the budget reserve was 
used to support Crimea in 2014, as were pen-
sion premiums, which were supposed to have 
been transferred to private pension funds8. 
The draft budget for the years 2015-2017 esti-
mates that the cost of Crimea and Sevastopol’s 
maintenance will exceed $2.5 billion per year 
(not counting investments), and that half of this 
sum will be spent on subsidies to their budgets.
The annexation was not preceded by legal and 
organisational preparations: only after Russia 
seized the peninsula did President Putin order 
the Ministry of Regional Development to pre-
pare a ‘Programme for Development of the Re-
public of Crimea and the Federal City of Sev-
astopol by 2020’ which specified the necessary 
investments in infrastructure and other sectors 
of the region’s economy. 
According to the programme, the largest invest-
ments from the federal budget will be spent on 
the expansion and modernisation of Crimea’s 
infrastructure, including: 
• the construction of transport links with Rus-
sia (the key investment is the construction of 
a road-rail bridge across the Kerch Strait); 
• Crimea’s gasification and the construction 
of an energy infrastructure linking the penin-
sula with Russia; 
• the expansion and modernisation of water 
supply and sewerage.
However, the Russian budget for the years 
2015-2017 lacks sufficient funds to implement 
these ambitious investment plans in Crimea 
($8.5 billion versus the required $22.5 billion)9, 
and so additional sources of financing are being 
sought. To cover Crimea’s needs in the coming 
7 The average pension in Ukraine is 5700 rubles, while in 
Russia it is about 10,000 rubles. Social allowances and 
reliefs that are in force in Russia, such as the maternity 
capital, are to be introduced in Crimea.
8 www.interfax.ru/business/382558
9 http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20140709/788002223.html
years, the government will have to abandon 
part of the investments in other Russian re-
gions. Among other reductions, the Ministry of 
Finance proposes to dispense with the strategic 
project to construct a bridge over the Lena River 
in Yakutia and roads leading to it, which will 
save $1.3 billion10.
Another of the government’s ideas to attract 
investors is the creation of a Special Economic 
Zone on the peninsula, termed a ‘civilized tax 
haven’, that would grant preferential terms to 
investors. Furthermore, during his visit to Chi-
na in May, President Putin encouraged Chinese 
entrepreneurs to invest in Crimea, including 
by continuing the projects agreed on during 
the former Ukrainian President’s Viktor Yanuk-
ovych’s visit to China in December 2013.
The costs Crimea will bear
The process of integrating the newly created 
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol City with 
Russia’s institutional, political and economic 
space is complex and entails significant costs, 
financial, organisational and social, since the 
annexation has severely affected or even com-
pletely severed economic and institutional ties 
with Ukraine. One of the first stages of this 
integration was the introduction of the Rus-
sian rouble as of 1 June 2014, which replaced 
the Ukrainian hryvnia.
10 www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/28921021/lena-bez-
mosta-i-dorogi
By annexing Crimea, Moscow has taken 
on the burden of subsidising the region’s 
loss-making economy and restoring its 
institutional, economic and infrastructur-
al links with Russia.
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Russia’s annexation of Crimea has hit all the 
branches of Crimean economy. It has severed 
production ties and supply channels, and re-
sulted in the cancellation of many contracts 
with suppliers and customers in Ukraine and 
the EU11, thus causing problems for industry 
and agriculture. Customers are suffering from 
shortages and rising prices of goods12. To avoid 
popular discontent, the Crimean authorities 
have issued an order to reduce the margin of 
profit applied to basic groceries to 10%13. Many 
foreign companies and retail chains have with-
drawn from the peninsula14.
Entrepreneurs are also facing problems with 
customs clearance of goods (because of the 
differences in sanitary and veterinary regula-
tions between Russia and Ukraine). Information 
shortages and legislative chaos have accompa-
nied the process of calculating VAT, which has 
been reduced to 4% (from 18% in Russia) for 
the next 2 years15. Another business issue that 
needs to be solved quickly is the requirement 
to re-register the businesses in accordance with 
Russian legislation. This procedure is likely to 
11 Following a decision by the EU Council, a ban has been 
introduced on imports of goods from Crimea and Sev-
astopol that do not possess a certificate of origin issued 
by the Ukrainian government.
12 Before the annexation of Crimea, 80% of goods were 
supplied to the peninsula from Ukraine, and only 2% of 
the demand was covered by local production. The Crime-
an authorities have had to prohibit the exportation of 
many food items beyond the peninsula in order to re-
duce shortages in the shops. Currently, goods are being 
delivered to the peninsula mainly via ferries across the 
Kerch Strait. Some produce reaches Crimea illegally from 
Ukraine, www.rbcdaily.ru/economy/562949991590590
13 http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/25447668.html
14 http://cre.in.ua/news/2014/04/23/iz-kryma-uzhe-ushli-
5-setey-i-okolo-50-brendov
15 On the other hand, entrepreneurs have been deprived 
of their previous opportunity to postpone the payment 
of VAT until their investments begin to generate income.
drag on, as in the case of a joint stock compa-
ny, the consent of all shareholders – including 
Ukrainian – will be required. Another problem 
is the ban on exports from Crimea due to the 
EU sanctions, which has affected the famous 
Crimean Massandra wines, among other prod-
ucts. Moreover, the winery faces a problem with 
selling its produce in Russia: due to a specific 
production procedure, Crimean wine is classi-
fied as a ‘wine drink’, on which a very high ex-
cise duty is imposed16.
The most acute problem for Crimea is the trans-
port restrictions, which have not been resolved 
by the addition of ferry and air connections. 
Transport costs have increased, and trucks have 
to wait for several days in ports to be transport-
ed to Crimea.
Residents are concerned about the supplies of 
electricity and thermal energy in the peninsula, 
which is delivered from power plants located in 
other regions of Ukraine, as well as the increase 
in tariffs17. Similar concerns apply to supplies of 
drinking water and its price; 85% of the water 
consumed in Crimea is pumped from the Kak-
hovsky reservoir on the Dnieper in Ukraine18. 
The peninsula’s agriculture has already suffered 
significant losses due to insufficient irrigation of 
the fields. With all the problems that are occur-
ring, no efficient mechanisms for solving them 
have been created; they are being dealt with by 
way of ad hoc temporary interventions.
A major impediment for business, but also for 
Crimea’s inhabitants and tourists, is the reor-
ganisation of the banking sector. Most of the 
Ukrainian and foreign banks operating on the 
peninsula have pulled out, and Russian banks 
have only begun organising their activities19. 
16 In Russia, the excise tax on Crimean ‘wine drinks’ is 50 
times higher than under Ukrainian legislation, http://
economics.lb.ua/business/2014/05/28/268077_vina_
massandri_rossii_sochli.html
17 The tariff on electricity transmission from Ukraine to Crimea 
has risen from 1520 to 3420 rubles per megawatt as of 
1 June, www.epravda.com.ua/news/2014/06/20/468900
18 The Crimean authorities intend to raise charges for water 
supply from Ukraine from 0.06 to 0.40 ruble per 1 m3.
19 The Russian National Commercial Bank, Kraiinvestbank, 
Genbank, Just Bank and other.
It is a matter of prestige for Russia to 
prove that the annexation of the peninsula 
is beneficial for the Crimean economy and 
will raise people’s living standards. 
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Mostly these are minor Russian banks which are 
supposed to take over the Sberbank, VTB and 
Alfa-Bank branch networks; the latter, which 
hold numerous assets abroad, have withdrawn 
from the peninsula for fear of US and EU sanc-
tions20. This makes it hard for residents to ob-
tain a loan or use credit cards; most transac-
tions have to be carried out in cash. 
Another regulation which may severely affect 
the inhabitants is the extension of the expro-
priation procedure. The Crimean parliament 
has adopted a law granting the government 
the right to carry out compulsory acquisition of 
property which is owned by legal and natural 
persons and considered ‘strategic’ by the au-
thorities21. This has fuelled public anxiety about 
hostile takeovers of attractive property, such 
as land on the coastline and tourist facilities.
Another acute problem is the collapse of the 
tourism sector since the annexation of Crimea, 
which has significantly reduced the residents’ 
income. Previously, Crimea was visited by about 
6 million tourists a year22 (70% of them were 
citizens of Ukraine), of which only a small part 
chose an arranged stay (resorts or hotels)23. 
Most tourists rented private lodging from lo-
cals; nearly half of the population made mon-
ey this way, their income being unreported. 
In the summer season of 2014, the citizens of 
Ukraine boycotted Crimea24, which exposed the 
residents to large losses. Their losses were not 
compensated for by an increased inflow of Rus-
sian tourists (about 1.1 million people by July), 
20 The Rossiya Bank, controlled by Yuri Kovalchuk, which 
is a subject of US sanctions, is to take over servicing 
payments for electricity supplies from Alfa Bank. This 
should help Rossiya to increase its turnover and thus 
cover part of the losses suffered.
21 The law was passed on 9 July 2014. www.rg.ru/2014/07/09/
reg-kfo/vikup.html
22 Data provided by the Crimean Ministry of Tourism.
23 In 2013, only 1.1 million visitors opted for organised 
tourism, of whom 900,000 stayed in sanatoriums, and 
200,000 in hotels. http://svpressa.ru/economy/arti-
cle/85472
24 The Crimean authorities claim that so far in 2014 the 
peninsula has been visited by 200,000 Ukrainian citizens 
(15% of the previous number of visitors). http://ru.krymr.
com/content/article/25457232.html
because the majority of them choose to stay 
at hotels and resorts.
The tourist industry’s problems require Mos-
cow’s intervention to compensate for the de-
crease in the number of tourists. The State 
Agency for Tourism (Rosturizm) was instructed 
to provide Crimea with no less than 3,000,000 
tourists from Russia in the summer season of 
2014. As of 1 June 2014, the government 
launched additional low-budget airline con-
nections to Crimea from 17 Russian regions. 
The Crimean and Sevastopol city budgets re-
ceived funding to organise leisure activities for 
children from the Russian regions25. The govern-
ment has also launched a campaign to promote 
a ‘patriotic’ holiday in Crimea, which often in-
volves putting pressure on Russian officials, re-
gional authorities and public sector employees 
to spend their summer vacations in Crimea. 
To help with attracting tourists, a gambling 
zone is being created in Yalta, on the initiative 
of President Putin26.
Meanwhile, the attempts to direct Russian tour-
ists to Crimea are likely to affect the prosperi-
ty of what has hitherto been the most popular 
Russian resort, Sochi. During preparations for 
the Winter Olympics, the tourist facilities, san-
atoriums and spas in Sochi were developed, 
expanded and thoroughly modernised. How-
ever, Moscow’s current efforts to support the 
Crimean tourism sector must inevitably lead 
to a reduction in the role of Sochi as a major 
Russian centre of tourism, international confer-
25 http://itar-tass.com/obschestvo/1253511
26 Putin signed the law on gambling zones on 23 July 
2014. Apart from Crimea, gambling zones are to be 
established in Krasnodar krai (in Sochi), Primorsky krai, 
Altaisky krai and Kaliningrad oblast.
Russia’s deteriorating economic situation 
and the US and EU sanctions will make 
the costs of integration a significant bur-
den on the Russian budget.
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ences and business, as well as its status as the 
‘gambling capital’ (as already mentioned, Yalta 
has also gained this status). Moreover, the Rus-
sian campaign promoting Crimea has indirectly, 
and unintentionally, struck at Sochi; it empha-
ses how low the prices in Crimea are (and this 
contrasts with Sochi’s ill-famed costliness), and 
depicts Crimea’s numerous monuments and 
places of interest (while Sochi’s architectur-
al merits are rather modest, to say the least). 
All this causes concerns in Sochi, which is losing 
its status as the main Russian holiday centre on 
the Black Sea27.
The annexation of the Republic of Crimea and 
Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and their 
integration with Russia’s constitutional and po-
litical space will entail serious political changes, 
and result in the reduction of their political au-
tonomy in comparison with their former status 
in Ukraine. Crimea was an autonomous parlia-
mentary republic; the president’s office existed 
only in 1994-1995. The highest authority was 
exercised by the parliament of Crimea, the Su-
preme Council, which was constituted in gen-
eral elections, and appointed the government 
and a Prime Minister28. Russia pushed through 
a Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and 
a Statute of the federal city of Sevastopol29 
27 http://ru.krymr.com/content /%D1%81%D0%BE%D1% 
87%D0%B8-vs-%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%
BC/25355751.html
28 The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
Chapter 3, http://www.rada.crimea.ua/bases-of-activity/ 
konstituciya-ARK
29 The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea as a region of 
the Russian Federation: www.rada.crimea.ua/content/
uploads/files/konstituciya.pdf, the statute of Sevastopol: 
sevastopol2011.ru/news/ustav_goroda_sevastopolja_
prinjatyj_tekst/2014-04-19-7455
(hastily adopted on 11 April 2014, with no dis-
cussions or consultations). These documents 
state that the heads of the two new Russian re-
gions are designated by their legislatures from 
among candidates put forward by the Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation. In practice, this 
means their direct appointment by the Kremlin. 
Symptomatically, Crimea and Sevastopol have 
been ‘assigned’ a procedure for appointing the 
governor which is only valid in several repub-
lics of the North Caucasus, instead of by gen-
eral election, as in all the other regions of the 
Russian Federation. New parliaments in Crimea 
and Sevastopol will be elected in regional elec-
tions on 14 September 2014, despite numerous 
doubts concerning the organisation of elec-
tions, such as whether Russian passports can 
be issued to all residents30. Until that moment, 
the peninsula will be managed by Vladimir Pu-
tin’s appointees: the acting Governor of Crimea 
Sergey Aksyonov (a politician and businessman 
with a criminal record), and the acting Gover-
nor of Sevastopol Sergei Menyailo (a retired 
Vice Admiral of the Russian Black Sea Fleet).
Crimea will also have to adapt to the more re-
strictive Russian legislation regulating the po-
litical and social sphere, which may lead to re-
strictions in civil rights for Crimean residents, in 
comparison with the Ukrainian period. Greater 
restrictions will be imposed on the activities of 
NGOs, organisation of referendums and rallies31, 
and on the media (both online and offline). Sev-
eral newspapers and online portals have already 
been closed32, which has raised fears of further 
restrictions for journalists.
30 The issue of Russian passports to residents of Crimea 
who adopt Russian citizenship was extended till the end 
of 2014 (the original deadline was set for 18 June 2014). 
After the annexation of Crimea, all registered residents 
automatically received Russian citizenship; non-regis-
tered residents had to go through the application pro-
cedure
31 In April 2014, the Russian police dispersed a rally in Sev-
astopol, even though it did not require notification to 
the city authorities (under the transitional period, when 
Ukrainian legislation still applied).
32 AN-Crimea, Sobytiya Kryma, Krymskoye Vremya, Res-
publika and other media have been closed.
The Russian budget for the years 2015-
2017 lacks sufficient funds for the im-
plementation of its ambitious investment 
plans concerning Crimea. 
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Forecast
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has already en-
tailed significant expenses from the Russian 
Federation budget for the institutional and so-
cio-economic adaptation of the peninsula. Part 
of these expenses are temporary, but most of 
them will also have to be borne in subsequent 
years. The largest investments, spanning over 
many years, will have to be made in the con-
struction of transport, energy, water and gas 
infrastructure. However, the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation in Russia and the economic 
sanctions imposed by the US and the EU will 
make it a significant burden on the Russian 
budget. Private investors, including those from 
abroad, will be unlikely to take financial risks 
in a situation where most countries do not 
recognise the annexation of Crimea, which in 
turn will make it difficult to obtain loans and 
investment insurances. It seems clear even to-
day that the costs of Crimea’s integration with 
Russia will be much higher than the initial as-
sumptions, as was the case with Russia’s most 
prestigious investments in recent years, namely 
the APEC summit in Vladivostok and the Winter 
Olympics in Sochi.
A significant part of Russian society seems to 
be unaware of these costs33. This is largely due 
to the efforts of the government, which is do-
ing its best to reinforce the social consensus on 
the Crimean issue, transmitting a propaganda 
of success and camouflaging the costs of the 
integration. Nevertheless, rumours are circling 
in regional communities about the possible cuts 
in social benefits and transferring these funds 
to Crimea34. In the future, when the ‘Crime-
an euphoria’ falls away, the social perception 
of Crimea may resemble that of the North 
Caucasus, whose reintegration with Russia has 
entailed enormous financial and social costs. 
Today the attitude to this region is best cap-
tured by the popular saying: “Stop feeding 
the Caucasus!”
33 A Levada Centre poll from 6 May 2014, www.levada.ru/06-
05-2014/rossiyane-ob-ukrainskikh-sobytiyakh
34 Such questions were raised during Vladimir Putin’s 
annual online conference on 17 April 2014.
